Yield Curve Theories and Their Applications Over Time by O\u27Donnell, Michael Richard
Bard College 
Bard Digital Commons 
Senior Projects Spring 2020 Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects 
Spring 2020 
Yield Curve Theories and Their Applications Over Time 
Michael Richard O'Donnell 
Bard College, mo8383@bard.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2020 
 Part of the Finance Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
O'Donnell, Michael Richard, "Yield Curve Theories and Their Applications Over Time" (2020). Senior 
Projects Spring 2020. 115. 
https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2020/115 
This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or 
related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard 
College's Stevenson Library with permission from the 
rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way 
that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For 
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-
holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by 
a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the 
work itself. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@bard.edu. 
Yield Curve Theories and Their Applications Over Time 
  
  
 
 Senior Project Submitted to 
 The Division of Social Studies 
 of Bard College 
  
 by 
Michael O’Donnell 
  
  
  
  
 
 Annandale-on-Hudson, New York 
 May 2020 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to first thank my incredible family for providing me relentless offers of 
support, and for the strength they have shown in the event of adversity. They have only 
ever wanted the best for me in life, and as a son, is the greatest feeling in the world. I 
would also like to thank my advisor for this senior project, Leanne Ussher. Leanne, you 
have been nothing but supportive and helpful, often sacrificing extra time in your busy 
days to answer small questions and provide feedback. You have been integral in my 
confidence to be able to finish this project, and through its ups and down, you have never 
given up. I one day hope to be able to help a young person, as you have helped me. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Abstract 
Introduction 
Chapter I: Introduction to Yield Curve Theories and Terminology  
1.1 Term Structure of Interest Rates 
1.2 Yield Curve Slope 
1.3 Role of the Federal Reserve 
1.4 The Monetary Policy Tools of the Federal Reserve 
1.4.2 Federal Funds Rate 
1.4.3 Repurchase Agreements (REPOs) 
1.5 Basic Pricing Mechanisms for Debt Securities 
1.6 Unbiased Expectations Theory 
1.7 Duration Premium Theory 
1.8 Market Segmentation Theory 
Chapter II: Historical Analysis of Federal Reserve Policy Separated by 
Chairmen  
2.1 The Decades Preceding the Paul Volcker Era 
2.1.2 The 1960’s 
2.1.3 The 1970’s 
2.2 The Paul Volcker Regime 
2.2 Analysis of Volcker Regime 
2.2.2 Unbiased Expectations Theory Through the Volcker Era 
2.3 The Alan Greenspan Regime and Greenspan’s Conundrum 
2.4 Ben Bernanke on the Decrease in the Term Premium 
2.5 The Fed’s Narrative vs. Other Theories 
2.6 Ben Bernanke, The Financial Crisis (2008), and Credit/Quantitative Easing 
2.7 Janet Yellen’s Exit of Credit/Quantitative Easing and Effective Lower Bound 
2.8 The Jerome Powell Regime 
Conclusion 
References  
 
3 
 
Abstract: 
This thesis will analyze three theories that can explain the term structure of interest 
rates: The Unbiased Expectations Theory, the Duration Premium Theory, and Market 
Segmentation Theory. The paper will analyze what factors and expectations drive these 
theories, and how the Federal Reserve has shaped monetary policy within the context of 
these theories, from Paul A. Volcker to Jerome H. Powell. The paper will also analyze 
what narratives set out by the Federal Reserve, and their explanations of the yield 
curve/interest rate behavior through speeches delivered by the Fed Chairman and other 
Federal Reserve Governors.  
 
Introduction: 
 
This paper will cover three term structure of interest rate theories and how we can 
apply them over time to explain the behavior of interest rates. The Unbiased Expectations 
Theory, Duration Premium Theory, and Market Segmentation Theory, will be the three 
theories analyzed. The ways in which these theories explain the term structure of interest 
rates will be discussed as well as how monetary policy can influence the yield curve. 
Monetary policy and the Federal Reserve play a key role in this thesis as the narratives of 
the Federal Reserve will be analyzed over the timeline of Fed Chairman overtime (Paul A. 
Volcker - Jerome H. Powell).  
 ​Chapter I will focus on explaining the yield curve, its shape, and why it is 
important. In addition, Chapter I will cover the role of the Federal Reserve and why it 
plays an important role in determining the term structure of interest rates; the tools that the 
Federal Reserve has in order to carry out effective monetary policy are paramount to the 
story of how investors anticipate and analyze the yield curve, as the Fed is the main figure 
when it comes to interest rates.  
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Next, the basics of how fixed income securities are priced will be discussed, as it is 
important for how investors value these debt instruments. Lastly, Chapter I will end with 
the Unbiased Expectations Theory (UET), the Duration Premium Theory (DPT), and 
Market Segmentation Theory (MST). These theories will all be explained in Chapter I, but 
will be analyzed and put into context in Chapter II, where we will be able to see how to use 
these theories under different Fed Chairman to interpret the term structure of interest rates 
under different scenarios for investor expectations. 
Moving into Chapter II, focus will shift from the fundamentals of the term structure 
of interest rates to a historical analysis of the yield curve under a variety of Federal 
Reserve Chairman, ranging from Paul A. Volcker (1979-1987) to Jerome H. Powell 
(2018-current). The historical analysis will cover the challenges that have been presented 
to each Federal Reserve regime. 
1.1 Term Structure of Interest Rates 
When we think about interest rates, we must consider them from the perspective of 
the lender and the borrower and their expectations, without ignoring the feedback between 
the market and the role played by the Federal Reserve policy makers in attempting to 
control those expectations. From the perspective of the lender, interest rates provide a 
measure of return on the principle being extended to the borrower. If we know this, then 
we can say that the interest rate is a method of quantifying a borrower’s riskiness by 
lenders. On the other side of a trade, we assume the opposite to be true for the borrower, as 
they will seek the lowest interest rate in order to achieve the lowest cost of capital 
available. Economists use diagrams displaying interest rates across different terms to 
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maturity for a single issuer in an instant of time; this is called a yield curve. Typically the 
standard yield curve reports on the rates of United States Treasury bills and bonds. Banks 
as well as other lending institutions use the Treasury yield curve as their point of reference 
for pricing their own lending rates, such as mortgage rates, business loans, certificates of 
deposit, etc.  
In terms of the different shapes that yield curve may exhibit at any time, they are 
closely tied to the market’s (lenders’ and borrowers’) expectations for  future short term 
rates. Given this baseline, the “normal yield curve” is a situation in which Treasuries with 
longer terms to maturity such as a 10 or 30 year securities have a higher yield than 
securities with shorter terms to maturity such as the 3 month or two year. This is 
considered a normal yield curve and could be explained by investors demanding a higher 
yield on bonds with longer maturities than shorter maturities due to the risk associated with 
a longer investment horizon (later on we shall describe this as the duration premium). In 
the case of an inverted yield curve, bonds with shorter terms are linked with higher yields 
than that of longer term bonds. This occurs despite the positive duration premium, and 
could be due to the expectation for the short term rate to fall in the future. Lastly we can 
consider a flat yield curve in which the yields of all bonds, both long term and short term, 
are similar to each other or almost equal. Interestingly, we shall see that a flat yield curve 
infers that the market expects short term interest rates to fall. Beneath is a more in depth 
perspective on these shapes of the yield curve - normal, flat, and inverted. 
6 
1.2 Yield Curve Slope 
In looking at the figures below (1.1a-1.1c), we can note maturity or more 
specifically the length to maturity for each of the different investment products that are 
being portrayed on the horizontal axis. On the vertical axis we observe constant maturity 
rates, and on the horizontal axis each bonds length of maturity. In a normal situation where 
we would be observing an upward sloping yield curve as in the case of figure (1.1.a), we 
can see that as we move along left to right we will be recognizing a positive relationship 
between maturity and yield. This relationship is an upward sloping yield curve or in other 
words a positive correlation between yield and maturity of debt. In the case of a flat yield 
curve as seen in figure (1.1.b),  
 
Figure 1.1.a - (Data from Figures 1.1.a-1.1.c provided by ​https://fred.stlouisfed.org​) 
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Figure 1.1.b 
Figure 1.1.c 
we can see that regardless of the length of maturity investors will be looking at the similar 
yields. Last is the event of an inverted yield curve or a downward sloping yield curve 
represented by figure (1.1.c). In the case of downward sloping yield curves, we are 
observing a situation in which products with longer lengths to maturity are offering lower 
yields.  
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 The shape of the yield curve has long been associated with conversations regarding 
economic health, impending recessions, among other topics. There are many theories 
regarding the power of the yield curve to act as an indicator for future economic 
conditions. This paper will focus more on an historical account of the Federal Reserve’s 
approach to monetary policy under different chairmen from Paul Volker to Jerome Powell, 
so that we can evaluate the ways in which investors have used the Unbiased Expectations 
Theory, Duration Premium Theory, and the Market Segmentation Theory in response to 
different forms of monetary policies in a variety of economic and financial environments. 
1.3 Role of the Federal Reserve 
The Federal Reserve is the Central Bank of the United States and its board serves 
the United States federal government while its regional Federal Reserve Banks are private 
corporations serving regional banks.   The Federal Reserve (the Fed) is best thought of as 
an independent institution (although overseen by congress). The Fed has national 
responsibilities including but not limited to executing monetary policy, keeping the 
financial system stable and efficient, and providing liquidity to markets when necessary. 
The latter of the responsibilities of the Fed, providing liquidity to banks, is why the Fed is 
traditionally known as the lender of last resort to banks. This traditional role was expanded 
following the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-09 as the Federal Reserve became the lender 
of last resort to various markets e.g. the commercial paper market. In an emergency 
situation the Fed is able to provide significant liquidity to banks or other market 
participants. The Fed is able to do this by buying U.S. Treasuries from investors when 
bond market liquidity dries up. (Marc Labonte, Congressional Research Service, 2020, 
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pg.1 ) When considering the Fed’s responsibility of monetary policy, there are certain 
goals which the Fed attempts to achieve when instituting monetary policy; some of these 
goals include “maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest 
rates.” (Congress Reform Act, Public Law 95-188 95th Congress, 91 STAT. 1387, 
November 16, 1977). The Fed targets unemployment and we will see in Chapter II how the 
Central Bank and FOMC use monetary policy in order to meet their employment goals, 
which are subject to change and informed by current economic conditions. The Federal 
Reserve also targets price stability as seen in the case of Alan Greenspan. Currently, the 
Fed’s goal for price stability as of 2019-2020, is achieving and maintaining an inflation 
rate of roughly 2%; “In 1996, Fed policymakers privately agreed that their target for 
inflation was 2 percent, but, at Greenspan’s insistence, they didn’t tell anyone. In 2012, at 
the urging of then-Chair Ben Bernanke, the Fed formally and publicly announced that they 
were targeting a 2 percent inflation rate” (Summers and Wessel, 2018, pg. 10).  
1.4 Monetary Policy Tools of the Fed 
When the Federal Reserve is deciding on moving forward with either expansionary 
or contractionary monetary policy, the story can be told from the perspective of the Fed’s 
balance sheet. Let us first imagine a situation in which the Federal Reserve’s policy aim is 
to extend liquidity to the economy and financial markets. The Fed will then consider 
employing either Open Market Operations or a change in the Federal funds rate. Open 
market operations describes the Fed’s ability to either buy or sell U.S. Treasuries in the 
secondary bond markets. The Fed will typically buy or sell U.S. Treasuries or other assets 
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on its balance sheet through repurchase agreements, which will be discussed later in 
Chapter I. Repurchase agreements or REPO’s allow the Fed to control the supply of 
reserves in the market as well as allow them to achieve Fed Funds rates targets. In addition 
to REPOs, the Fed can lend to banking institutions through the discount window 
1.4.2 Federal Funds Rate 
The Federal funds rate is the FOMC's main policy mechanism. The Federal 
Reserve is able to set a target rate for the federal funds markets in which banking 
institutions are able to lend to one another. The Federal funds rate is referred to as the 
overnight lending rate, because this is that rate in which banks charge other banks for 
lending them reserve balances, overnight. There has been a long standing regulation that 
requires banking institutions to maintain a certain reserve requirement in an account at the 
Fed Reserve deposits held at the Fed by US deposit taking institutions (banks), which 
traditionally had a zero rate of return and were treated by banks as having an opportunity 
cost. The Fed then started paying interest on required reserves to stabilize the effective Fed 
funds rate and stop it from going below a lower bound target floor. Although prior to this 
date banking institutions would often operate with an excess of reserves on their balance 
sheet; however, banks now earn interest on excess reserves and “​the interest rate on excess 
reserves (IOER rate) is also determined by the Board and gives the Federal Reserve an 
additional tool for the conduct of monetary policy” (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Policy Tools). 
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For example, if the minimum reserve requirement for banks were 10% of 
depositsand Bank of America (BofA) were to have $500B in deposits on its balance sheet, 
with only $45B in reserves; BofA would need to borrow at least $5B in the fed funds 
market in order to meet their reserve to deposit ratio requirement of 10%. In the fed funds 
market, JP Morgan could be running on an excess of $75B in reserves and decide to extend 
$5B in reserves to BofA at the current overnight lending rate. Exchanges such as this 
example happen on a daily basis and are large in volume. According to the Chicago 
Federal Reserve “changes in the Federal funds rate trigger changes in other short- and 
medium-term interest rates, the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar and other asset 
prices that influence households' and businesses' spending and investment decisions” (See 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, ​www.chicagofed.org​). This is what makes the Fed 
Funds rate the most important rate in the United States and arguably in the world, as it is 
the benchmark rate to which credit cards, mortgages, corporate debt, among many more 
important rates are pegged to. The Federal Reserve plays an enormous role in the 
fluctuations of the yield curve through their usage of monetary policy and the Federal 
funds rate. Additionally, the Federal funds rate is thought of as a target rate, which the 
Central Bank reserves the right to change eight times over the course of the year depending 
on macroeconomic conditions, and can often be informed through forward guidance. The 
Federal Reserve has also been known to let the Federal funds rate target become a 
tolerance range as in the case of Chairman Paul Volcker.  
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1.4.3 Repurchase Agreements (REPOs) 
REPOs or repurchase agreements are contracts in which one party, typically a 
dealer in U.S. Treasuries will sell investors U.S. Treasuries and then buy them back the 
next day. The difference between the price of the sale of the treasuries and the repurchase 
of the treasuries from the Fed by the dealer, is the REPO rate (See Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, March 2020). The Federal Reserve uses REPOs as a tool for monetary policy 
to regulate and can help meet monetary aggregate target rates. In addition, if the Fed needs 
to reduce the supply of reserves, it can engage in a reverse REPO agreement where the 
opposite happens with the same agents. In this case the Fed sells bonds to an institution in 
exchange for reserves; this temporarily decreases the supply of reserves available for a 
brief period of time, until the Fed must repurchase the treasuries the next day (See Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, March 2020). Another noteworthy aspect of REPOs is that the 
security that is sold, otherwise thought of as collateral, does not have to​ be​ in the form of 
U.S. Treasury securities. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York “Securities 
eligible as collateral for both overnight and term operations include Treasury, agency debt, 
and agency mortgage-backed securities” (See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, March 
2020). This makes REPOs a valuable tool for the Fed to adjust and control the money 
supply of reserves, in addition to being a critical tool for keeping the Federal funds rate at 
target level. Prior to 2008, REPO operations were the most common tool of the Fed when 
employing monetary policy.  
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1.5 Basic Pricing Mechanisms for Debt Securities  
To begin to understand how debt securities of any kind are valued, it is important to 
understand what they are made of and how they are priced. For most purposes we can 
think of bonds as contracts that entail a series of payments all due at specific dates. The 
two entities involved: the lender and the borrower, engage in an IOU where the contract or 
legal document lays out the parameters for which the borrower owes the lender and when, 
additionally the contract will lay out details as to what should happen to the borrower if the 
borrower fails to meet their obligations (Cecchettim and Schoenholtz, 2008, pg. 87). In 
fixed income markets, we can observe hundreds if not thousands of different types of 
bonds available to investors; moreover there are many different borrowers available 
offering all different types of debt products. Out of the many different varieties of bonds, 
the most common type is the coupon bond. These can be structured in different ways, 
especially depending on the length of maturity, however they are mostly laid out in a series 
of payments from the borrower to the lender and typically pay back principle at the end of 
the contract along with a final coupon payment. The amount of the payments are simply 
called coupon payments, and these payments may occur as frequently as daily, weekly, 
monthly, or annually. Coupon payments are often described as coupon rates which refer to 
the total annual payments as a percentage of the face value of the bond .  
In order to add color to the valuation methods of debt securities, we can consider 
the following equations. As an example we can think about a bond, where we are 
14 
attempting to calculate the value of the principal payment. We would do this by using the 
equation given by Cecchetti and Schoenholtz:  
VP = F V
(1+i) nt
(1.1) 
 
where ​PV ​is the present value of bond, ​FV​ is face value, ​n ​is the time to maturity, ​t​ is the 
period of coupon payment per annum, and ​i​ is the interest rate per period 
This is also the basic equation for pricing securities, under the assumption that the 
instrument returns a single payment at the end of maturity, otherwise known as a 
zero-coupon bond. Although this can be helpful in the case of valuing a specific one 
payment zero-coupon bond, we know that this is not always the case. In practice most 
securities return multiple payments at multiple future dates. In order to put a value on these 
types of financial instruments we must know the amounts and dates of these payments. 
Once we have this information we can understand the value of the security by a summation 
of all future payments discounted back to the present (Mishkin, Frederic S. The Economics 
of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets pg 66).  
(1.2)V     . . .   ]P = [ CF(1+i) +  
CF
(1+i)2
+ CF
(1+i)3
+  CF(1+i)n +  
F V
(1+i)n    
 
(1.2) Mishkin, Frederic S. The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets pg 66 
 
PV=Present Value, CF=Cash Flow, i=Interest Rate, n=Years to Maturity Date. 
Where the present value (​PV​) of these future cash flows (​CF)​, or future payments is what 
we use in order to derive the total value of the asset. In addition to this valuation of the 
complete life of a debt security, investors find this equation useful when trying to put a 
15 
valuation on the remaining life of a security. From a financial engineering perspective, 
investors can also find value in segmenting existing debt products by payment periods, 
therefore creating an entirely new group of products. For example, the holder of a 1 year 
bond that provides payments every month, could divide the preexisting bond into 12 
different cash flows; the monthly payments on the previous 1 year bond would now 
become the ending payment for the new holder of one of the 12 products. To further the 
example, if the investor were to segment said 1 year bond and sell the 10th month payment 
to a trader at UBS Securities at the beginning of the life of the 1 year bond, the investor 
would sell this product at the present value of the 10th month payment, and on the 10th 
month or the maturity of this new product, the trader at UBS Securities would receive that 
payment. This kind of trade is especially helpful for those who are only looking to hold 
securities with a certain investment horizon, and can always be done as long as there is 
ample liquidity in bond markets, which is typically always true.  
1.6 Unbiased Expectations Theory 
 
 Unbiased Expectations Theory (UET) attempts to predict what short term interest 
rates will be in the future based on current long term rates. UET suggests that a long term 
bond rate would equal the geometric average of current and future short term rates 
covering the same investment period. For example, UET suggests that the yield on a three 
year U.S. Treasury bond is equal to the combined yield of owning three consecutive 1 year 
U.S Treasuries. Additionally, UET infers that the yield curve slope depends on the 
expected future path of short term rates (Mishkin, 2004, pg. 129-130). The theory is 
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grounded in the arbitrage-free notion that an investor should realize identical gains on 
purchasing, for example, two consecutive one year treasury bonds or a two year treasury 
bond today, and therefore should be able to calculate the future one year rate, one year 
from now. “The expectations hypothesis implies that yields on short-term bonds will be 
more  volatile than yields on long-term bonds. Because long-term interest rates are 
averages of a sequence of expected future short-term rates, if the current 3-month interest 
rate moves, it will have only a small impact on the 10-year interest rate” (Stephen, 
Cecchettim, 2016, pg. 177). The unbiased expectation theory is therefore useful for 
explaining the shape of the yield curve.  
For example, when we are considering a positively sloping or normal yield curve, 
then we would assume that investors expect higher short term rates in the future. This 
would also suggest that investors are expecting a strong economy in the future. 
Conversely, if we were to consider a downward or inverted yield curve, this would convey 
the message that investors are predicting lower short term rates in the future. This would 
also indicate that investors are pessimistic about the economy in the future. The reason for 
the relationship between the short and long end of the yield curve being indicative of future 
economic conditions has to do with investors expectations about how the Fed will change 
rates. To go further into this, we must understand that the Fed lowering rates is a signal to 
investors that the economy might not be at full steam and could stand to gain from lower 
rates. On the other hand, if the Fed were to decide that a rate increase is suitable, this 
would signal to investors that the Fed views the economy as strong and could stand to 
benefit from a health standpoint, from a bit of deceleration in growth due to higher rates. 
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Going back to the yield curve, the long end of the curve (i.e. maturities of 10+ years) will 
be dependent on the outlook of economic health per the view of investors. In the case of an 
inverted or downward sloping yield curve we can see how pessimistic investor behavior is 
able to pull yields down on the long end of the curve, as a response to the Fed lowering 
Fed Funds Rates. It is this relationship between the Fed and their ability to change 
overnight rates with investors who are taking Fed action as signals for economic health, 
which makes controlling the shape of the yield curve so difficult for the Fed; a major 
question is whether or not the Fed is able to effectively control the term structure of 
interest rates.  
According to this theory, the shape of the yield curve is not only a gauge of future 
economic conditions but also an indication to investors of future short term rates. In the 
case that we see a normal yield curve, UET suggests that because the curve is upward 
sloping, future short term rates are expected to rise. When considering a flat yield curve, 
future short term rates are expected to remain similar or the same. Lastly when there is an 
inverted or downward sloping yield curve, the expectation according to UET is that future 
short term rates are going to decline. In financial markets, this theory is often used as an 
‘arbitrage theory’ in which investors are able to lock in forward rates for short term debt 
instruments in futures markets based on their analysis of what future short term rates may 
look like based on the slope of the yield curve. One of the most notable investment 
strategies stemming from the UET is the rollover strategy, involving analyzing futures 
rates in order to predict or lock in rates. “The expectations hypothesis tells us that 
long-term bond yields are all averages  of expected future short-term yields—the same set 
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of short-term interest rates—  so interest rates of different maturities will move together” 
(Stephen, Cecchettim, 2016, pg. 176).  
        ​(1.3)1 r )  [(1 r )(1 f )(1 f ) . . . (1 f )]( +  0 n
n =  +  0 1 +  1 1 +  2 1 +  t+(n−1) 1  
(1.3) Describes a rollover strategy equation in which we should be able to, under the UET, 
calculate for future short-term interest rates given the long-term rates. Where ​n=Years to 
Maturity, r=Interest Rate, and t=Years Forward From Today, and f=Forward/Future 
Rate.  
Ideally, there should be no arbitrage opportunity given the assumption of the 
efficient markets hypothesis, so in the case of fixed income securities of different 
maturities an investor should be able to equate for example a two-year loan contracted 
today payable in two year with a one-year loan contracted today and payable this year and 
a one-year loan contracted next year, payable in two years. In the case of efficient markets, 
we should observe no opportunity for investors to make any profits from choosing between 
the two investment strategies. However, in the real world forward rates and expected future 
spot rates are often utilized in order to produce a profit for investors.  
1.7 Duration Premium Theory 
In its most natural form, the duration premium can be thought of as a premium on 
an asset that investors demand in cases where the given asset is considered to have poor 
liquidity. The higher the duration premium is for a given asset, the more risky the asset is 
deemed to be. Stephen and Cecchettim state that “long-term interest rates are typically 
higher than short-term interest rates because long-term bonds are riskier than short-term 
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bonds. Bondholders face both inflation and interest rate risk. The longer the term of the 
bond, the greater both types of risk. (Stephen, Cecchettim, 2016, pg. 177). Additional risk 
is taken on in the form of liquidity; if investors are locked into a bond with a longer term to 
maturity, then they would be foregoing liquidity, this is an additional reason why investors 
demand a premium for duration. Volatility in interest rates in terms of debt securities is a 
higher risk for longer term maturities. This is called duration or price elasticity to a change 
in interest rates. To compensate investors for investing longer term there is a higher 
interest premium. In addition to both liquidity and interest rate volatility risk, investments 
with longer time horizons are also subject to inflation risk. When we think of the liquidity 
premium in terms of the yield curve, and were to be observing an upward sloping yield 
curve, we would be able to recognize a liquidity premium between 3-month Treasury 
bonds and 30-years. Liquidity premium would suggest that the higher yield of the 30-year 
as compared to the 3-month bond would be due to the longer investment horizon of the 
30-year bond, as long term investments demand a higher rate of return compared to short 
term investments. The Duration Premium Theory can also be thought of as similar to the 
expectation theory, however the assumption that all bonds can be considered perfect 
substitutes is not carried over to the Duration Premium Theory. When considering the 
increase of a premium on securities due to an increase in their maturity or investment 
horizon, we can make sense out of why this would contribute to an upward sloping yield 
curve.  
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1.8 Market Segmentation Theory 
 Market segmentation theory poses the notion that both investors and lenders have 
preferences for maturity that they maintain in fixed income markets. MST also differs 
greatly from the UET, in that bonds of different maturities cannot act as perfect substitutes 
for each other. Mishkin says that “the key assumption in the SMT is that bonds of different 
maturities are not substitutes at all, so the expected return from holding a bond of one 
matrity has no effect on the demand for a bond of another maturity” (Mishkin, 2004, pg. 
132). The result of different preferences in fixed income markets, therefore create a variety 
of smaller markets which all have their own supply and demand forces, which dictate 
unique equilibriums for each submarket. In understanding this, market segmentation theory 
is suggesting that we should not be analyzing the yield curve as a whole. In contrast to 
analyzing the entire yield curve, we should be looking at the yield curve in segments: short 
term, mid-term, and long-term bonds. For example, in the corporate bond market, we could 
more vividly see how the demand and supply of debt securities would have its own 
independent forces dependent on term maturity. On the short end of the corporate bond 
yield curve, the supply of commercial paper would be dependent on a variety of balance 
sheet factors such as inventories or accounts payable. Demand for short term bonds would 
be dependent on the demand of investors and their appetite for short term investments for 
their excess cash. This market equilibrium for short term bonds between investors and 
corporations is what will determine short term interest rates on short-term bonds. This is 
how market segmentation theory would suggest that mid-term and long-term bonds operate 
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as well; as the supply for mid-term and long-term bonds may be determined by 
corporations need for mid-term or long-term financing options (property, plant, and 
equipment, acquisitions), and the demand for such mid-term or long-term bonds coming 
from the demand of investors who may need to add longer-term income to their portfolios 
for a variety of reasons. It’s clear that the defining factor of market segmentation theory is 
that within the yield curve, markets function independently. Under this assumption, there is 
little to no correlation between the rates given in the short-term through the long-term, and 
neither rates are affected by each other. The assumption of independent markets is based 
on the notion that investors and lenders are engaging in a specific maturity based on their 
need to meet and match their own assets and liabilities;  Johnson, Zuber and Gandar, state 
that “MST is the idea of unique or independent markets. According to MST, the short-term 
bond market is unaffected by rates determined in the intermediate or long-term markets, 
and vice versa. This independence assumption is based on the premise that investors and 
borrowers have a strong need to match the maturities of their assets and liabilities”. 
(Johnson, Zuber, Gandar, 2010, pg. 6-7).  
2.1. The Decades Preceding the Paul Volcker Era:  
The story of​ ​Paul A. Volcker, the chairmen of the Federal Reserve from 1979 to 
1987, is hallmarked by his successes in overcoming the challenges of a decade of high and 
volatile inflation in the 1980’s. Volcker previously served as a Senior U.S. Treasury 
official throughout the 1960’s up until his role as Fed Chairman in 1979.  During his time 
with the U.S. Treasury, Volcker was involved and familiar with the inflationary challenges 
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in the United States. The 1960’s and 1970’s were a time defined by multiple economic 
expansions and contractions, with a variety of exogenous and endogenous economic 
shocks, that would help prepare Volcker for the challenges that he would eventually face 
as Chairman of the Federal Reserve (see Federal Reserve History, Paul Volcker). 
2.1.2 The 1960’s 
The mid 1960’s marked the beginning of the United States battle with high 
inflation; a byproduct of high oil prices, fiscal policies, war, and unemployment, among 
other causes, especially apparent in the 1970’s. The years 1965 to roughly 1984 were 
characterized as The Great Inflation, which was not only an economic event but also a 
politically driven issue (Meltzer 2005, pg.145). Over this course of time, there were a 
multitude of global events and pressures from different administrations that proposed a 
series of challenges to the Federal Reserve from a monetary policy standpoint. As will be 
seen, the Federal Reserve during this period, would mainly fail in its ability to act as an 
independent entity of the White House Administrations, would not be able to curb inflation 
in a precautionary manner, and would continue to allow high inflation to remain as a 
component in the economy. In November of 1956, the change in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) was roughly 3% (data from fred.stlouisfed.org), a relatively high and concerning 
number as viewed by the Fed. 
Following a recession in 1957-1958, Federal Reserve Chairman McChesney Martin 
would struggle with monetary growth. Admitting that he did not understand the money 
supply, Martin dismissed monetary growth, however other Governors urged for a control 
23 
over monetary growth unless it would negatively affect unemployment. For example 
“Governor Sherman Maisel, at the Board from 1965 to 1972 . . . urged a policy of 
controlling money growth. He was not, however, willing to control inflation if it required 
more than a modest increase in the unemployment rate” (Meltzer, 2005 pg.150). The 
disinterest from the Fed in finding a better balance between inflation and unemployment 
stemmed from a post-WWII era in which Kenyesian policies were deployed to prevent 
another 1930’s level of unemployment (Michael Bryan, 2013).  
The Phillips Curve was a theoretical model of the relationship between 
unemployment and inflation, a relationship which the Federal Reserve believed that they 
could actively manage and control in order to achieve desirable levels of unemployment. 
Milton Friedman found that it would be the case in which market participants would 
predict inflation based on the Phillips Curve, causing a cycle in which this anticipation 
would shift the curve upwards, leading to continued inflation in order to sustain optimal 
levels of unemployment. Friedman’s critique would differentiate the Phillips Curve 
between the long run, and the short run as he would write “there is always a temporary 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment; there is no permanent trade-off. The 
temporary trade-off comes not from inflation per se, but from unanticipated inflation, 
which generally means, from a rising rate of inflation” (Milton Friedman, Friedman: 
Monetary Policy, pg 11.). Friedman points out the flaws in the Phillips Curve’s original 
assumption that the curve maintained a constant trade-off between unemployment and 
inflation, where he argues that the curve exhibits a temporary trade-off.  
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Milton Friedman's work on the phillips curve and the relationship between inflation 
and unemployment is especially important in understanding why this period was ravaged 
by constantly growing inflation. In order to achieve the targeted low levels of 
unemployment, especially levels falling below the natural rate, the economy would be 
subject not only to high inflation, but to a constantly rising level of inflation; “Milton 
Friedman, first argued in the late 1960s that any tradeoff between inflation and 
unemployment would exist only in the short run; once the public expected higher inflation 
in the future, the effect would disappear. Thus, expansionary monetary policy leads to 
more inflation rather than a decline in the unemployment rate” (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland, 2011). 
By this time the U.S. economy was operating at an inflation rate around 3.4% 
during 1966, and 3.7% at its highest in October of that year. In order to combat the concern 
of inflation and the speed at which the economy was expanding, the Fed had made the 
decision to tighten credit for a short time (6 months); this would lead the economy to 
experience deceleration in growth, but allow inflation to fall to 2.78% by the end of 1967, 
and help to avoid a recession. Following the second quarter of 1967, economic growth had 
begun to re-accelerate; this, coupled with the economic consequences of the United State’s 
conflict in Vietnam, quickly spiked inflation to 4.7% by 1968 and 6.2% by 1969. (Mussa 
2005, ) 
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2.1.3 The 1970’s 
The story of global conflicts would continue through 1973 as inflation would hit 
8.7%, and then to 12.3% in 1974; this was largely attributed to a rise in oil prices following 
the Arab Israeli conflict in 1973. The Fed’s actions in response to the dramatic spike in 
inflation was to revert to monetary policy in the form of increasing the Federal funds rate. 
By increasing the Federal funds rate, in addition to rising energy prices, contributed to a 
peak in economic expansion, which led to a sharp decrease in economic conditions and 
more specifically a decreased U.S. inflation rate. The mid 1950’s through the mid to late 
1970’s was a time period of drastic economic and inflationary volatility; the Federal 
Reserve was struggling to provide consistency in inflation to the economy, as the central 
bank juggled with battling inflation and challenged Fed officials to provide effective 
monetary policy, without inducing multiple recessions. Such a challenge is alien to the 
modern day economy, as the current central bank regime has been, as of 2019-2020, 
struggling to push inflation up to its target rate of 4% (more of this will be discussed later 
in Chapter II). 
Mid-1974 to 1975 would mark a “deep recession” (Mussa, 2005) in history, but the 
central bank would have achieved partial success in lowering inflation. The Federal funds 
rate at its highest point was at 13% in mid-1974 and had declined to 5% in mid-1975. The 
decrease of the Federal funds rate was the central bank's reaction to an economy that was 
in a contractionary stage; further, the decrease in the Federal funds rate was a reaction to 
the decrease in other short-term rates.  
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Through 1978, economic expansion began to move in an aggressive fashion as the 
White House under the Carter Administration was encouraging economic growth to fight 
unemployment in 1977. The administration's goal of economic expansion had been met; by 
the end of 1978, real GNP had increased 6.3% and inflation was up from 6.7% at the end 
of 1977 to 9% by the end of 1978. Naturally, the reaction of the FOMC was to begin to 
hike Fed funds rates and they did that; in 1978 the Fed funds rate was increased 3 times, 
landing at 10% by the end of the year. During this time, the FOMC formally declared the 
objective of controlling inflation a higher concern than maintaining the current economic 
growth rate in April of 1978.  
In 1979, the U.S. economy again faced more inflation related challenges as global 
pressures, specifically in energies, as oil prices began to rise once again due to conflicts in 
Iran. “The energy component of the CPI showed a 37.4 percent increase during 1979, 
compared with an 8.0 percent increase during 1978, and this helped raise the overall 
inflation rate from 9.0 to 13.3 percent” (Mussa, 2005, pg. 91). Again, the FOMC would 
continue to consider controlling inflationary pressures as its number one priority moving 
forward through the year. In combination with a nervous outlook on the acceleration of 
inflation, the FOMC midway through the year would come to expect economic declines, as 
second quarter data exhibited a decline in economic growth, and would suggest economic 
contractions to continue throughout that year. When looking at the performance of the 
Federal Reserve in attempting to keep inflation at bay, it is apparent that during the 1970’s, 
the Fed mishandled the use of the Federal funds rate in order to combat the issue. The Fed 
was not efficient in their abilities to prevent inflation, but were only committed to 
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responding to inflation; Mussa writes that “increases in the Federal funds rate often lagged 
behind increases in the inflation rate, indicating fairly clearly that the Federal Reserve was 
"falling behind the curve" in its actions to combat rising inflation” (Mussa, 2005, pg. 95).  
2.2. The Paul Volcker Regime: 
During August of 1979, Paul Volcker was appointed Chairman of the Fed. Volcker 
was familiar with the challenges and tasks of the central bank as he had been serving as 
president of the Fed for four years and had been acclimated with the Nixon Administration. 
Under the control of Volcker, the central bank would quickly begin to rethink its strategy 
and the ways in which it could employ its tool in order to curb volatile inflation.  
The Open Market Desk would change the way in which it would operate; instead of 
taking directives from the FOMC in order to dictate a Federal Funds target range, it’s main 
objective would be to achieve target rates of monetary growth by controlling the supply of 
reserves. The FOMC would recommend a volume of reserves to banks that would allow 
the economy to achieve short term monetary growth targets, and the Open Market Desk 
would conduct the supply. This change marked an important point in how the central bank 
would behave. By changing to a monetarist conduct of policy, the central bank signaled to 
markets that it would be allowing the Fed funds rate to fluctuate in a wider range; this gave 
the central bank much greater flexibility to respond to macroeconomic developments with 
the Fed funds rate. For example, rather than allowing a tolerance range of the Fed funds 
rate of 1% or .5%, the Fed funds rate in 1979 would range from 11.5% to 15.5%.  
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The effects of the Fed were immediately evident in market data, as short term rates 
grew, long term bond prices began to drop, and the Fed Funds market immediately began 
to test its upper limits. By the end of 1979, the Fed had raised its range to 15.5%-20%. 
Inflation wasn’t turning around either as the fourth quarter of 1979 as the annualized 
inflation rate in December was 13.4%. Moving into 1980, the economy was pushed into a 
recession as a result of the Feds tight monetary policy and the Carter Administration’s 
interference with consumer credit. By May, the Fed funds rate had dropped down to 13%, 
and in response the FOMC lowered its lower bound tolerance rate to 10.5%. The rate cuts 
continued as the low range of the target rate would fall to 8.5% by June, marking a 10% 
decrease in the bottom range of the tolerance rate from March-June 1980. The cuts and 
declines of the Fed funds rate were expected, and were a direct result from the Fed's 
actions of targeting monetary growth; since Open Market Desk was supplying more 
reserves to the market, the rate in the Fed Funds market naturally declined. Due to such 
extreme tightening of policy, the recession was dramatic as GNP declined by roughly 9% 
(1980, Q1-Q2). Though the decline in the economy was steep, it was relatively brief for a 
recession; recovery in the economy was beginning to surface in the summer and by the end 
of the year the economy was showing modest gains in GNP at around 5%.  
Inflation through 1980 was inconsistent, but by the end of the year it could be said 
that the Federal Reserve was partially successful in curbing inflation by the end of the 
year; annual inflation was down to 12.5% in December from 13.9% in January. Though 
inflation was down by the end of 1980, the central bank knew that it had come at a cost. 
The Federal Reserve was partial in their success to curb inflation due to political reasons as 
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well. The summer of 1980 preceded the election of Ronald Reagan, the Federal Reserve 
moved to a much more dovish tone. In choosing to delay aggressive policy, the Federal 
Reserve was allowing itself to become distant to the outcome of the election. Once Reagan 
was elected, the Fed would be free again to engage in its intended tightening of policy; the 
Federal Reserve did so through 1982. Following the election the Fed funds rate had 
reached 19% by December of 1980, in addition monetary aggregates were now beginning 
to fall back into the mid to higher segments of their target ranges.  
Moving through 1981, tight monetary policy would continue and a recession would 
take place in the fourth quarter of the year; the Federal funds rate remained high 
throughout 1981, ranging from 15%-20%. Despite the costs to the economy, inflation was 
coming down. Much of the same costs that were paid in 1980, were similar to those 
experienced in 1981, as a recession similar to the scale of 1980’s recession was looming as 
late 1981 economic data was signaling economic downturn. From the Q3 to the Q4 of 
1981, GNP had dropped 10.1%; from Q4 1981-Q1 1982, GNP had dropped another 4%. In 
Q1 of 1982, the Central Bank was heavily focused on controlling the growth of monetary 
aggregates and this seemed to be working; December of 1981 inflation was 8.92% and by 
the end of March 1982 inflation was at 6.78%. In the summer, the Federal Reserve and 
FOMC had begun to ease their tight policy, raising monetary aggregate targets.  
Although monetary aggregates did not immediately grow, the Fed funds rate had 
dropped from 14.5% in late June, to 9% by late August. By this time monetary aggregates 
were beginning to grow, and would continue to grow through 1983. Despite subjecting the 
economy to multiple recession, inflation was ultimately handled as average inflation in 
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1983 was 3.22%, in comparison to an average rate of 13.58% in 1980; inflation would 
remain low throughout Volckers tenure as Chairman of the Fed, not exceeding inflation of 
4.5% through 1987 (Mussa, 2005, pg. 96-98). 
2.2.1 Analysis of Volcker Regime: 
In this portion of the chapter, we will examine the performance of monetary policy 
under Paul Volcker. It is clear that Volcker inherited the reigns of the Federal Reserve in 
an economic environment being torn apart by inflation and unemployment. Volckers 
greatest achievement was being able to put an end to an era of volatile and high inflation, 
regardless of the economic costs; Volcker succeeded. By changing the behavior of the 
FOMC in targeting monetary aggregates in a more direct form helped Volcker achieve 
such a feat, but the ways in which interest rates were manipulated is what will be more 
closely analyzed in this portion of the chapter. By taking a monetarist approach, Volcker 
subjected interest rates to extreme volatility in the first half of his tenure as Fed Chairman. 
Much literature discusses movements in the short end of the yield curve during this era, 
however for the purposes of analyzing interest rates through the interest rate theories in 
Chapter I, we must analyze rates beyond the short end of the curve.  
2.2.2 Unbiased Expectations Theory Though the Volcker Era: 
1980-1981 was a unique period for the yield curve, as it not only inverted, but 
interest rates were at historical highs; in the Fed’s tightening of monetary policy, 
short-term rates rose to nearly 20%. If we were to analyze the actions of Volcker through 
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the lense of the Unbiased Expectations Theory, know that the UET is not only a theory of 
expected short term rates based on the long end of the yield curve, but further that the 
theory is based on expected inflation; according to UET, future inflation will impact long 
term rates thus providing the markets with an indication of future short term rates. In the 
case of 1979, Volcker had immediately begun to aggressively fight inflation as soon as he 
was announced Chairman. By switching to a monetarist approach, the Federal Reserve was 
handling the Fed funds rate by not targeting it, setting a wide tolerance range. According to 
UET, the market reaction to falling long term rates is a real indication that investors had 
strong confidence in Volckers ability to handle inflation at this point, as UET suggests that 
the market was anticipating a drop in the Fed funds rate in the future due to low inflation. 
At the end of 1979 the spread between the 10-year and 2-year U.S. Treasury was -0.9% 
and by March of 1980, the spread was -2.34%. 
As the yield curve began to invert at a more extreme level, the Fed funds tolerance 
rate was and the actual Fed funds rate were at historic levels beginning in 1980; the 
tolerance range in late 1979 was set at 15.5%-20%. During the spring of 1980, the Fed was 
forced by way of nonpartisanship to the ongoing election to loosen its monetary policy for 
the time being, so it did. However, it was clear to markets under this theory that investors 
had confidence that Volcker would be able to handle inflation and that it would decrease in 
the future. Inflation under the UET is important because it is the first indicator to investors 
because it signals future action by the Federal Reserve to encourage higher short term 
interest rates. The significance of the UET during this time period was that the market was 
indicating that Volcker would be successful, putting faith in new FOMC operations. This 
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was historic in that the Federal Reserve would be targeting the monetary aggregates 
relative to other concerns, and that the Fed would be comfortable in letting short time rates 
skyrocket; this is why the time period of 1979-1982 is a prime example for displaying the 
UET.  
In order to better understand how investors were analyzing the bond markets of this 
time period, we can use the UET with Federal Reserve Economic Data to run the theory. 
By the end of December 1980, the 2-Year Treasury Rate was 14.08%, and the 1-Year 
Treasury Rate was 14.88%; from this data we should be able to solve for the expected rate 
of the 1-Year Treasury Bond in December of 1981. We can get an expected rate of the 
1-Year Treasury Bond, in 1981 (1 year forward from December of 1980) by recalling the 
expectations theory​ the equation as follows:  
         (​2.1)1 r )  [(1 r )(1 f )(1 f ) . . . (1 f )]( +  0 n
n =  +  0 1 +  1 1 +  2 1 +  t+(n−1) 1  
This equation (2.1) denotes an expected rate(s) by rolling over a series of 1-year bonds, 
n-years. The left side of the equation will be: 
   (1 r ) .301352045 +0 2
2 = 1 (​2.2) 
Since we know the value of the current (December 1980) 1-Year Treasury rate we can 
input it such that the right side of the equation now becomes: 
      1.301352045 (1.1488)(1 f )]   = [ + 1 1 (​2.3) 
       .132783554 (1 f )]  1 = [ +  1 1 (​2.4) 
 f  ≈ 13.27%   1 1 (​2.5) 
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Solving for our new equation we find that  (2.5), or our expected 1-year rate of 1981 is f 1 1  
roughly 13%, and the actual 1-year Treasury rate in December, 1981 ranged from 11.47% 
to 14%, averaging roughly 12.7%. 
I then tested the UET for the years 1978- 1983 (end of year) as these were the most 
economically unstable years under Volcker. The methodology is simple; the process of 
(2.1) - (2-5) is expanded for years 1978 -1983 (end of year). The is found for each year f 1 1  
for a total of 72 observations (72 months - 6 years). We then subtract the from the f 1 1  
actual 1-Year rate, 1 year in the future; this will give us a differential between the expected 
rate result from the UET equation and the actual 1-Year rate (1 year in the future). The 
differentials are then organized for frequency, by “Bins” which are ranges of 1%,  so that 
we are able to see how accurate the UET is in providing expected 1-Year U.S. Treasury 
rates, 1 year in the future, and also so that we can observe if the UET was overestimating 
or under-estimating future 1-Year U.S. Treasury rates.  
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Figure 2.2.2 - Data Source: ​https://fred.stlouisfed.org​ *displays the differentials 
between the expected 1-Year U.S. Treasury rate, 1-Year in the future as given by 
equation (2.1), and the actual 1-Year U.S. Treasury rate, 1-Year in the future 
 
In terms of the results of this test, 56.94% of the time equation 
(2.1) overestimated the 1-Year U.S. Treasury rate, 1 year in the 
future, and 43.06% of the time it under-estimated. ​ In Table 
2.2.2 (a), we can see the distribution and frequency of the 
differentials. Of the 72 observations, 65.28% of the expected 
1-Year U.S. Treasury rates, 1 year in the future, from the UET 
equation (2.1) were accurate within a range of -3% 
underestimation, to 3% overestimation of the actual ​1-Year U.S. 
Treasury rate, 1 year in the future. 
 
Table 2.2.2 - Data Source: ​https://fred.stlouisfed.org​ *displays the differentials between the expected 1-Year U.S. 
Treasury rate, 1-Year in the future as given by equation (2.1), and the actual 1-Year U.S. Treasury rate, 1-Year in the 
future, and the frequencies of the differentials sorted by bins with ranges of 1% 
 
 
35 
 So, if investors were using UET during this time period, they would be able to  
predict the future 1-Year U.S. Treasury rate, 1 year in the future, within a 6% range (-3% 
to 3%), 65.28% of the time, and within a 4% range (-3% to 1%), 55.56% of the time.  
 
2.3 The Alan Greenspan Regime & Greenspan’s Conundrum 
Alan Greenspan followed Paul Volcker and served as both Federal Reserve 
Chairman and the FOMC Chairman from 1987-2006, serving five terms under four 
different presidents. Greenspan's tenure as Chairman can be best summarized as, like 
Volcker, anti-inflationary and with a strong focus on controlling prices. Greenspan is also 
known for what is “Greenspan’s Conundrum” or also known as the “Bond Yield 
Conundrum” (Daniel L. Thornton, 2012, pg. 2)..  
Greenspan’s Conundrum was a situation in which the long-term rates of the yield 
curve were not responding to changes to target rates of the Federal funds rate in the ways 
that the Federal Reserve/FOMC were anticipating as a drop in long-term rates in response 
to the tightening of monetary policy is unusual.  
In February 2005, Greenspan and the FOMC had previously raised the Federal 
funds rate target by 1.5%, however had observed that long-term rates had fallen. From 
June 2004 to February 2005, the 10-Year Treasury Rate had fallen from 4.37% to 4.17% in 
response to a 1.5% increase in the Fed funds rate during the same period of time. In 
February of 2005, in the Federal Reserve Board's semiannual Monetary Policy Report to 
Congress, Greenspan had said that: 
“In this environment, long-term interest rates have trended lower in recent 
months even as the Federal Reserve has raised the level of the target Federal funds 
rate by 150 basis points. This development contrasts with most experience, which 
suggests that, other things being equal, increasing short-term interest rates are 
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normally accompanied by a rise in longer-term yields. The simple mathematics of 
the yield curve governs the relationship between short- and long-term interest rates. 
Ten-year yields, for example, can be thought of as an average of ten consecutive 
one-year forward rates. A rise in the first-year forward rate, which correlates 
closely with the Federal funds rate, would increase the yield on ten-year U.S. 
Treasury notes even if the more-distant forward rates remain unchanged. 
Historically, though, even these distant forward rates have tended to rise in 
association with monetary policy tightening.” 
(Greenspan February 16, 2005) 
 
(Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan Federal Reserve Board's semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 
Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate February 16, 2005). 
Figure 2.5 - Effective Federal funds rate & 10-Year Constant Maturity Rate - Data Source: fred.stlouis.org 
 
       In Figure 2.5, we can see how the 10-Year Treasury rate was directly responding to 
changes in the Federal funds rate, displaying what Greenspan was observing. Don H. Kim 
and Jonathan H. Wright (2005) had produced an “Arbitrage-Free Three-Factor Term 
Structure Model”, which would help evaluate the term-premium for long term yields such 
as the 10-Year Treasury rate. Kim and Wright found that “estimates imply that if the term 
premium had not changed, ten-year yields would have risen modestly over this time 
period, as one would expect in an environment of monetary policy tightening” (Kim and 
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Wright 2005, pg.11). Kim and Wright do not however, explicitly explain what exactly is 
causing a decline in the term premium, however Daniel Thorton (2012) expresses that in 
an internal memo to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Joshua Rosenberg 
(Chief Risk Officer for the Federal Reserve), noted that “the decline in the term premium 
from Kim and Wright’s (2005) model into (a) changes in risk, (b) risk aversion, and (c) 
foreign demand” (Daniel L. Thornton, 2012, pg. 3).  
In 2007, David Backus and Jonathan Wright published a report and analysis 
regarding the 2004-2006 “conundrum” in which they attempt to explain the fall in the term 
premium. Backus and Wright (2007) analyze the cyclical behavior of interest rates, looking 
at how the relationship between the past three periods of tightening monetary policy (1986, 
1994, 1999), and 10-Year Treasury rates. The relationship during these three periods was 
clear and expected as the rate on 10-Year Treasuries had increased along with higher 
Federal Funds target rates.  
We should remember the relationship between the Unbiased Expectations Theory 
and the Duration Premium Theory. The Duration Premium Theory is a modification to the 
Unbiased Expectations Theory; it adds a premium which in theory increases as the term to 
maturity increases due to liquidity risks, inflationary risks, price volatility risks, among 
others risks which explain a higher duration premium for longer maturities. In the case of 
Greenspan’s Conundrum the market was not reacting in a way in which the UET could 
explain as long term rates were decreasing in response to an 150bps increase in the Federal 
funds rate, however given the modification of the Duration Premium Theory, we can see 
how a diminishing premium to long term Treasuries could explain the drop in forward 
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rates as well as drops in long term rates. Kim and Wright note that “Over this time period 
[June 29, 2004 to July 29, 2005], the ten-year zero-coupon yield fell 50 basis points, but 
the associated term premium is estimated to have declined by about 80 basis points. 
Accordingly, the model [The Arbitrage-Free Three-Factor Term Structure Model and the 
Recent Behavior of Long-Term Yields and Distant-Horizon Forward Rates] estimates 
imply that if the term premium had not changed, ten-year yields would have risen modestly 
over this time period, as one would expect in an environment of monetary policy 
tightening” (Kim and Wright 2005, pg 11). Kim and Wright’s findings that the 10-Year 
rate would have risen due to an increase in the Federal funds rate with an unchanged term 
premium, speak directly to the assumption of the Duration Premium Theory that bonds of 
different maturities are not perfect substitutes due to different values of risk associated 
with duration; in this case there is a diminishing premium for duration.  
2.4 Ben Bernanke on the Decrease in the Term Premium 
Moving into 2006, Ben Bernanke was appointed Chairman of the Fed and would 
serve two terms, ending his tenure in 2014. Bernanke was a member of the Board of 
Governors at the Federal Reserve as of 2004 and was able to reflect on Greenspan’s 
Conundrum as he began his role as Chairman of the Fed. In a speech to the Economic Club 
of New York in March 2006, Bernanke made comments consistent with the DPT findings 
in 2.3. Bernanke commented on the behavior of long term yields stating 
 
“The ten-year Treasury yield, for example, can be viewed as a weighted average of 
the current one-year rate and nine one-year forward rates, with the weights depending on 
the coupon yield of the security. As I will discuss, each of these forward rates can be split 
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further into (1) a portion equal to the one-year spot rate that market participants currently 
expect to prevail at the corresponding date in the future, and (2) a portion that reflects 
additional compensation to the bondholder for the risk of holding longer-dated 
instruments. . .​ ​As I have noted, each of the forward interest rates implicit in the term 
structure can be usefully decomposed into two parts: (1) the spot interest rate that market 
participants currently expect to prevail at the corresponding date in the future and (2) the 
additional compensation that investors require for the risk of holding longer-term 
instruments, known as the term premium. With the economic outlook held constant, 
changes in the net demand for long-term securities have their largest effect on the term 
premium.​” 
 
(Reflections on the Yield Curve and Monetary Policy, Chairman Ben S. Bernanke Before the Economic Club of New 
York, New York, New York, March 20, 2006) 
 
 
Bernanke here is describing the relationship between (1), the UET, and (2), the 
DPT. Additionally, Bernanke is speaking to the MST “changes in the net demand for 
long-term securities have their largest effect on the term premium” (Bernanke, 2006). 
Bernanke in the same speech then goes on to list four possible reasons that may explain the 
decline in the term premium. ​First, “longer-maturity obligations may be more attractive 
because of more stable inflation, better-anchored inflation expectations, and a reduction in 
economic volatility more generally” (Bernanke 2006). Second, “the increased intervention 
in currency markets by a number of governments, particularly in Asia” (Bernanke 2006). 
Third, that “changes in the management of and accounting for pension funds are a source 
of a declining term premium” (Bernanke 2006). Fourth, “as investors' demands for 
long-duration securities may have increased over the past few years, the supply of such 
securities seems not to have kept pace” (Bernanke 2006). In Bernanke’s first reason for the 
decline in the term premium can be mostly characterized by the “Great Moderation” 
(Bernanke 2004), which can be defined as a period of economic stability; stability is 
thought of in terms of reduced inflation and GDP volatility due to “structural changes in 
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the economy such as deregulation, improved inventory control methods, and better 
risk-sharing in financial markets” (Bernanke 2006), such that the market would not be 
demanding such a high premium for risk, resulting in a decreased term premium.  
In the second explanation for the decline in the term premium, increased 
intervention in currency markets by foreign agents, Greenspan notes that foreign agents, 
specifically central banks, were deploying “a bulk” (Bernanke 2006) of their U.S. Dollar 
holdings into U.S. Treasuries. This would then increase demand for long-term U.S. 
Treasuries, therefore depressing yields. Bernanke also notes that in 2004, long-term yields 
dropped during the same period as increased purchases of U.S. Dollars by other central 
banks.  
Bernanke suggests in his third reason, that changes in pension funds may be 
responsible for the decline in the term premium. Due to developing reforms in the U.S. and 
Europe, pension funds needed to better match the duration of their assets and liabilities. 
Bernanke admits that there is “little direct evidence to date of sizable pension-fund 
portfolio shifts toward long-duration bonds” (Bernanke 2006).  
Lastly, the fourth explanation for the decrease in the term premium according to 
Bernanke is more a general macro shift in investors preferences for maturity; Bernanke 
suggests that there has been a rising demand for longer maturity bonds, however the 
market has failed to provide adequate supply in order to sustain demands, depressing 
yields for long-term bonds.  
2.5 The Fed’s Narrative vs. Other Theories 
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The narrative of the Federal Reserve on why they are not able to control long term 
yields with tight monetary policy is simple: The economy is moderating and the decreasing 
term premium is the result of investors signaling to markets that they no longer demand a 
high duration premium for risk associated with long term securities in fixed income 
markets. The Fed would be able to claim that their loss over the control of the yield curve 
was due to economic moderation; an ode to the Feds successes. However, in the years 
leading up to the Financial Crisis of 2008 it is clear looking back at financial and economic 
trends that investors had reason to be worried about the health of the financial sector, U.S. 
credit, and the economy. The rise of leverage on balance sheets, deregulation of the 
financial sector, and the high volume of securitized loans, are the typical suspects, but were 
only few of the many indicators of an imminent financial collapse. We know that investors 
during the years preceding the financial crisis of 2008 had anticipated the crisis, and UET 
would suggest that bearish investors could be responsible for Greeenspan’s Conundrum. 
Although this is what UET on its own would suggest, the explanation from the Fed and its 
DPT approach still remains valid as well. What we are suggesting is that these two theories 
can be, in conjunction with each other, responsible for the Greenspan’s loss of control over 
the long end of the yield curve. In fact, the bearish investors that remained bearish would 
be push down the long end of the yield curve due to negative expectations about the health 
of the economy and were anticipating a rise in short-term rates; where as the bulls of the 
market were, under DPT, anticipating a prolonged period of financial market stability and 
as a result were not longer demanding a duration risk premium for long-term debt anymore 
due to the perceived diminishing risk associated with holding long-term bonds..  
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For example, if we were to rely on the DPT and the suggestions that the value of 
the duration premium is diminishing, then we should reasonably expect that the long end 
of the yield curve is coming down; however DPT would still suggest a higher rate on long  
term maturity securities in comparison to that of the short end of the yield curve since we 
are not arguing that the term premium is only decreasing and not transforming into a 
negative duration premium; that long-term bonds still have a higher risk profile than that of 
a short-term bond, but that spread in risk is diminishing. This was not always the case with 
the yield curve under Greenspan. For example, the diminishing value of the duration 
premium under the DPT cannot solely support an in which the rates on a 3-Month bond are 
higher than that of a 30-Year bond, or an extremely inverted yield curve.  
 
Figure 2.6 - Source of Data: https://fred.stlouisfed.org  
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For this case, recall DPT’s assertion regarding the duration premium, that there is a 
positive relationship between risk and term to maturity; that is, the maturity of a bond  
determines the inherent levels of risk associated with the bond to the holder, including 
inflationary risks, liquidity risks, and interest rate volatility risks. In the highlighted portion 
of figure 2.6, we can see that the rates on 3-Month U.S. Treasuries are greater than that of 
the rates on 30-Year U.S. Treasuries. DPT in this case, does not provide a full explanation 
as to why this may be happening; the Federal Reserve argues that the decline in the 
duration risk premium is responsible, however it can only be possible that the decline in 
the duration premium is contributing to the conundrum and not explaining it. If the decline 
in the duration premium was solely responsible for the shape of the yield curve, then 
decrease in the duration premium would render the risk for 30-Year U.S. Treasuries to be 
negative; this would mean that an investor purchasing a 30-Year Treasury, which 
according to DPT should have more risk associated with it than a 3-Month Treasury, 
would be willing to accept less yield. This is certainly an unlikely event. However, it is 
more than reasonable to suggest that a declining duration premium is not completely, but 
partially, responsible for the relationship between the 3-Month and 30-Year Treasury rates 
during this period. So, it is possible that the relationship between the 3-Month and the 
30-Year Treasuries during this time period can be supported by the UET and DPT only in 
conjunction with each other. 
Both theories support the shape of the yield curve through Greenspan’s Conundrum 
and there is no reason to suggest that only one theory should be responsible. However, it 
additionally seems possible that there are reasons as to why the Fed would prefer to push 
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for a narrative coinciding with DPT rather than UET. If the Fed were to admit UET being a 
contributing theory to the conundrum, they would be validating negative market 
expectations, and a future recessionary episode; this would be a problematic admittance by 
the Fed.  
However, we are not only suggesting that two theories are responsible for 
Greenspan’s conundrum, but that there are three theories at work. Recall Bernanke’s third 
and fourth explanations for the decline in the term premium and we can understand that 
this explanation also supports the role of Market Segmentation Theory. Bernanke suggests 
that there was a macro-trend of the fixed-income market of rising demand for long-term 
securities and further that pension funds and foreign Central Banks were buying high 
volumes of long-term U.S. Treasury bonds (Bernanke, 2009). MST suggests that in the 
fixed income market there exists different supply and demand preferences which differ by 
term to maturity, therefore resulting in sub-markets governed by term maturity each with 
their own market forces. In addition to expectations under the UET which suggests a 
variety to reasons leading to investor expectations of lower future short-term rates, and a 
declining duration premium due to a new stability in the economy, the segmentation of the 
long end of the yield curve and the short end of the yield curve provides additional support 
for the decline in long term rates.  
During the time period of Greenspan’s Conundrum, demand for long-term U.S. 
debt was rising. Abroad, Asian countries specifically were contributing to much of the 
increase in demand for long-term U.S. debt. From 2000-2007, Chinese total foreign 
exchange holdings jumped from $168B to over $1.5T. China was doing this in order to 
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maintain the exchange rate of the Yuan to the U.S. Dollar since China was still pegging its 
currency to the U.S. Dollar. Then, China decided to begin to purchase long-term U.S. 
Treasuries since they would be able to receive interest on their holdings.  
From 2000-2007 Japan and China alone account for an increase in holdings of 
long-term U.S. Treasuries, an increase worth over $696B. In this short span of time, this 
accounts for a significant amount of long-term U.S. Treasuries, this increase is a clear 
representation of an increase in demand for long-term U.S. Treasuries, and would 
additionally affect the available supply of long-term U.S. Treasuries. These results of  
China’s and Japan’s increase in allocation of long-term U.S. Treasuries are consistent with 
Market Segmentation Theory. MST suggests that in this case, market forces of long-term 
U.S. Treasuries would be impacted by foreign central banks' increase in long-term U.S.  
Treasuries holdings, coupled with a restricted available supply due to the increase in U.S.  
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Figure 2.7 - Source of Data: ​https://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfhhis01.txt​ - * year end data. Majority of U.S. 
Treasuries owned by China have maturities exceeding 10 years; although specific data is not available, it is known that 
the overwhelming majority of U.S. debt held by foreign central banks was in the form of bonds (+10-year maturities) 
 
Treasury holdings would contribute to a decrease in the yields for long-term U.S. debt. In 
2004, Ben Bernanke,Vincent R. Reinhart, and Brian P. Sack wrote that “we find evidence 
supporting the view that asset purchases in large volume by a central bank would be able 
to affect the price or yield of the targeted asset” (Bernanke,Reinhart, Sack, 2004). They are 
not explicitly speaking to the increase in Chinese and Japanese balance sheet holdings of 
long-term U.S. Treasuries, however the actions of China and Japan and the findings of 
Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack, are consistent. Although, as said before, and despite the 
evidence in support for MST, we do not attribute MST to being a total, but only a partial 
explanation for Greenspan’s Conundrum. If we are to attribute the loss of control over long 
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term rates to a combination of DPT, UET, and MST, we are able to build a more complete 
explanation for Greenspan's Conundrum.  
2.6 Ben Bernanke, The Financial Crisis (2008), and Credit/Quantitative 
Easing 
The monetary policy actions following the financial crisis of 2008 were extreme. In 
September 2007, the target rate was lowered by 50bps, then lowered by another 300bps by 
the spring of 2008, and then by an additional 100bps in October 2008 (Bernanke 2009). By 
December, the federal funds target rate was reduced to 0 - 0.25 percent (Kohn 2009). 
Bernanke had reached the lower bound of the Federal funds rate so the next action by the 
Fed was to use monetary policy in order to provide short-term liquidity to markets to 
support credit as “​liquidity provision by the central bank reduces systemic risk by assuring 
market participants that, should short-term investors begin to lose confidence, financial 
institutions will be able to meet the resulting demands for cash without resorting to 
potentially destabilizing fire sales of assets'' (Bernanke 2009). 
 In November of 2008, the FOMC had announced that the Federal Reserve would 
be engaging in a program labeled Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP), in which the Fed 
would purchase mortgage backed securities and agency debt to provide short term liquidity 
to markets and would eventually begin to purchase long-term U.S. Treasuries (D’Amico, 
English, López-Salido, Nelson, 2012). The first round of LSAPs lasted until March 2010, 
which resulted in the Federal Reserve adding $175B worth of agency debt, $1.25T in MBS 
products, and $300B in long-term U.S. Treasuries; the Fed would also reinvest principal 
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payments from agency debt and MBS products into long-term U.S. Treasuries (see Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, Large-Scale Asset Purchases, programs archive). The second 
round of LSAPs would continue to add to the Fed’s balance sheet, adding $600B in 
long-term U.S. Treasuries from November 2010 to June 2011 (see Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, Large-Scale Asset Purchases, programs archive).  
In September 2011, the FOMC announced that they would be selling $400B in 
short-term U.S. Treasuries (maturities equal to or less than 3 years) in order to continue 
purchases of long-term U.S. Treasuries (maturaties equal to or greater than 6 years) (Mace 
2013). The program would continue through 2012, and would be labeled “the Maturity 
Extension Program, commonly known as Operation Twist, included purchases of $667 
billion in Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years, offset by 
sales of $634 billion in Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less” 
(see Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Large-Scale Asset Purchases, programs archive).  
These events are deeply reminiscent of Bernanke’s remarks in 2004 (Bernanke, 
Reinhart, Sack, 2004) regarding the effects of asset purchases of central banks, when 
conducted in high volumes. Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack, conclude that there is evidence 
to support the statement that central banking activity such as the Large-Scale Asset 
Purchase program, possess the ability to change the yield, rate, and price, of the asset that 
is being targeted; or, in other words, that the Fed’s efforts to provide liquidity to financial 
markets will have an effect on prices. In this case, this can be seen as true. When the Fed 
decided to begin to add roughly $300B, then later an additional $600B worth of long-term 
U.S. securities to its balance sheet, yields on the targeted maturities fell in response. MST 
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would suggest that the decrease in supply of treasuries with longer maturities due to 
LSAP’s, should suppress yields. Edison Yu from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
writes that “yields on Treasury bonds of the same maturity as those purchased through QE 
fell the most around QE events. For example, QE1’s purchases focused on two- to 10-year 
Treasury bonds, whose yields dropped more around the time of the QE1 announcement 
than yields for other maturities did. This difference indicates market segmentation and that 
QE worked by lowering the supply of bonds of particular maturities” (Yu, 2016, pg. 9-10). 
So we know that MST can be supported by LSAP efforts, but what about expected 
movements in the short end of the curve? We can combine the findings from MST during 
this time period, with UET in order to explain the changes in future short-term rates 
through changes in current long-term rates. The effects of UET can be more closely linked 
with forward guidance measures. Following the announcement of the LSAP in November 
of 2008, expected Fed funds rate fell, due to an expectation of declines in future long-term 
yields. Yu finds that “the estimated signaling effect [the announcement of LSAP’s] from 
lowering investors’ expectations accounted for a significant portion of the decrease in 
10-year bond rates — about 20 basis points for QE1, which was about 20 percent of the 
total change in yields over the same time (the 10-year Treasury yield dropped 107 basis 
points two days after the announcement of QE1)” (Yu, 2013, pg. 9). These outcomes of 
both the expectations, and actual effects of LSAP’s, provide a clear picture of the 
relationship between MST and UET during this period. MST would indicate to investors 
that the yields on long-term U.S. Treasuries would fall due to a $300B purchase in open 
market operations, which would then under UET lead investors to believe that the 
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short-term rates would then fall as a result, which can be reflected in the fall of the 
expected Fed funds rate. The DPT also continues to be a part of the story as the duration 
premium would continue to fall, but for other reasons than what have been previously 
associated with the decline in the duration premium (i.e. great moderation, market 
stability). The explanation as to why the duration premium is declining in this period is 
more related to that of the supply and demand story of MST, although from more of a 
supply side perspective. In 2013 Bernanke delivered a speech and explained that “as the 
securities purchased by the Fed become scarcer, they should become more valuable. 
Consequently, their yields should fall as investors demand a smaller term premium for 
holding them” (Bernanke 2013). Transitioning to the end of the credit/quantitative easing 
period, we can see that all three theories can work together to explain the yield curve, and 
that one theory is not sufficient to support the entire story. 
2.7 Janet Yellen’s Exit of Credit/Quantitative Easing and Effective Lower 
Bound 
 
Janet Yellen’s tenure was notably short, being nominated as Chair of the Federal 
Reserve from 2014-2018. Yellen became responsible for guiding the Fed funds rates out of 
lower bound territory, as well as reducing the size of the Fed’s balance sheet and unloading 
assets from the LSAP’s. Control over inflation and monitoring unemployment were two 
important objectives for the Yellen regime, specifically maintaining a target inflation rate 
of 2%. From 2011, to 2015, the annual inflation rate had dropped from 3% to 0.7%. 
Inflation expectations in 2015 were held low as temporary but substantial decreases in oil 
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prices and oil futures markets depressed inflation and expected inflation (Fischer, 2015). In 
December of 2015, the Fed for the first time in seven years had raised the target range of 
the Fed funds rate, this time by 0.25%. Also, the Fed was monitoring inflation 
compensation through a variety of metrics but most notably they were monitoring Treasury 
Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) against actual U.S.Treasuries. But in terms of the 
term structure, the yield curve was representing a normal and upward sloping curve.  
Figure 2.8 - Source of Data: ​https://fred.stlouisfed.org 
 
 
Through 2016, not much had changed in terms of the Fed’s attitude towards 
interest rates, with only one 25bp increase in the Fed funds rate in December. 2017 brought 
three rate hikes in March, June, and December, a total of 75bps bringing the target rate to 
1.25%-1.75%. Despite these increases, we can see in Figure 2.8, the term premium 
decreased 2017 and the rates for long term yields were decreasing. In 2017 the 30-Year 
Treasury rate dropped from 3.02% in January, to 2.77% by December. Jerome Powell who 
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at the time was a governor at the Fed, continued the decreasing term premium narrative in 
order to explain the low long-term rates. In 2017 Powell comments that 
“​The downward trend in nominal term premiums likely reflects both lower inflation 
risk and the fact that, with inflation expectations anchored, nominal bonds have become an 
increasingly good hedge against market risk. That has made bonds a more attractive 
investment and reduced the term premium . . . Regulations now require many financial 
institutions to hold more safe, high-quality liquid assets, which likely has pushed down 
term premiums further. Global factors may have put downward pressure on term premiums 
because of anxiety about the foreign outlook, which may have increased demand for U.S. 
assets, or because low rates abroad have depressed U.S. term premiums through a global 
portfolio balance channel.” 
(Jerome H. Powell, (January 07, 2017), “Low Interest Rates and the Financial System”, ​At the 77th 
Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, Chicago, Illinois) 
 
The relative attractiveness of long-term U.S. Treasuries in comparison to other 
asset classes that Powell is describing is also known as a flight to quality; an event in 
which investors tolerance for risk has diminished, and as a result reposition their portfolios 
with assets that are may not being providing as much yield as their previous investments, 
but will provide investors with positions that carry less risk. Powell mentions that expected 
inflation is stable, which provides investors with a favorable environment to engage in a 
flight to quality situation. It is also noteworthy that an investor will exercise a flight to 
quality with assets that match in maturity. So in this particular situation, Powell is 
suggesting that investors unloaded their positions in other fixed income products, for 
instance long maturity high-yield bonds, in exchange for U.S. Treasuries with similar 
maturities.  
The term premium was affected in a similar fashion that it had been in the case of 
increased Chinese and Japanese high volume allocations of U.S. Treasuries in the early 
2000’s. The only difference is that in the example of China and Japan, allocations of nearly 
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$700B in a 7 year span, resulted in a market shift that was only able to affect the term 
premium in a modest amount; yet the flight to quality episode that Powell describes, which 
is notably smaller in volume in terms of allocations of U.S. debt by investors, is an 
unlikely and incomplete explanation that can account for the decrease in the term premium 
that Powell and the Fed had been observing. If institutional traders in combination with 
retail investors were engaging in a flight to quality, it would need to be a dramatically large 
allocation of U.S. Treasuries, similar in size to the Chinese and Japanese central bank’s 
allocations, in order to result in a sizable impact on the term premium; comparing the 
increase in volume of retail and institutional investment in U.S. Treasuries due to a flight 
to quality to the activities of two of the largest central banks over the span of 7 years 
engaging in an aggressive allocation event of U.S. Treasuries seems unlikely.  
Although the impact of a flight to quality event by investors could, under the MST, 
contribute to depressed rates for long-term treasuries, it cannot support a full explanation 
for decreases in the rates of long-term Treasuries. Inflation during this time period had 
been underwhelming initially (0.12% 2014 & 1.26% 2015), but by 2016 had risen to 
2.13%, exceeding the Fed’s target by 0.13%. Inflation expectations were also exhibiting 
their confidence in economic health from an inflation perspective as 5-Year expected 
inflation over the next five-year period was hovering right around 2%, with a range of 
1.82% - 2.22% from January 2017 to December of 2018. 
The DPT is consistent with expected inflation and the decline in the term premium 
during this time period. The ability of Janet Yellen to control and keep inflation around 2% 
was being expressed by expectations of inflation, and could also be reflected by the 
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decreases in the term premium. The decreases in the term premium could be, in addition to 
the MST contributions, due to a decrease in the duration premium demanded by investors. 
The demanded duration premium could have decreased during this time due to the 
diminishing risks associated with the duration premium, inflation specifically. Stable 
expected inflation would reflect a decrease in future duration risk associated with 
long-term securities.  
The UET could contribute to the decline in the term premium in addition to DPT 
and MST, but would take a different approach to future expectations than the LPT. UET 
suggests that expectations of future short-term rates will fall as a result of low future 
inflation and is reflected by low long-term rates, whereas LPT had suggested that the 
declining term premium was a reflection of less duration and inflation risk. The 30-Year 
Treasury rate had fallen from 3.13% in 2018 to 3.03% by the end of the year. Under UET, 
the term premium was falling due to investor expectations about future short-term rates, 
and this was being reflected by a decline in long-term rates in 2018. Either way, both DPT 
and LPT were supporting the same results, although use different explanations to support 
the results.  
However, during Yellen’s tenure, UET would not support the term structure until 
2019, as short-term rates through 2018 (end of Yellen's tenure) did not decline, instead 
they increased modestly. In chapter 2.8, we will see that it wasn't until Q2-Q3 2019, that 
we would see short-term rates begin to fall with Fed funds target rate cuts three times in 
2019 (25bp cuts August, September, October) to a final target rate of 1.5% - 1.75%.  
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2.8 The Jerome Powell Regime 
Jerome Powell had taken over as Chairman of the Fed in February 2018, and the 
Fed became comfortable with the consiste​ncy of inflation and had consequently raised 
their Fed funds targets on four occasions in 2018 (25bp increases in March, June, 
September, December), resulting in a target range of 2.25% - 2.5% by the end of 2018. 
(see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Open Market Operations). As a 
result, short-term yields were increasing, however long-term yields were relatively flat 
through September. From a DPT standpoint, the duration premium for long-term bonds 
was diminishing as was the term premium. A decrease in the term premium could still be 
explained by DPT through consistency in inflation expectations, and investor confidence in 
the Fed’s ability to control over inflation. If investors were confident that inflation will be 
stable or decreasing and other risks to markets were decreasing, then that would be 
reflected in a decreased demand for risk compensation. UET during this time period 
supports the decline of the term premium during this time period as long-term yields which 
were being held flat relative to short-term yields, due to expectations that future short-term 
rates would fall. Following the rate cuts of August and September, the term premium had 
begun to increase, as spreads between 2-Year and 10-Year Treasuries rose from 0% on 
August 30, to 0.34% by the end of December. 
DPT would explain the decline in the term premium through 2018 by maintaining 
the position that the financial and economic climate suggested less risk for long maturity 
bonds, and as such would be reflected by a decreased duration premium demanded by 
investors. The 5-Year, 5-Year Forward Inflation Rate would decline in a small amount 
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from 2.15% in January to 2.03% in December, which would support the notion that there 
was less inflation risk, and therefore a decrease in the demanded duration premium. 2019 
showed similar behavior in the 5-Year, 5-Year Forward Inflation Rate, and would record a 
small decline of 0.15% (January - December 2019). 
Figure 2.9 - Source of Data: ​https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T5YIFR#0 
 It most certainly is possible that this could be the case, and this explanation would 
be favorable for the Fed, however UET would suggest that the decline in the term premium 
could be reflective of decreases in future short-term rates, due to low expected inflation. 
UET during this time period supports the decline of the term premium during this time 
period as long-term yields which were being held flat relative to short-term yields, due to 
expectations that future short-term rates would fall. Following the rate cuts of August and 
September, the term premium had begun to increase, as spreads between 2-Year and 
10-Year Treasuries rose from 0% on August 30, to 0.34% by the end of December. The 
yield curve in the end of 2018 through 2019 began to better support the UET as long-term 
yields had held relatively steady as the term premium was still declining. Around 
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April-May, the yield curve began to invert, which began to signal that future short-term 
rates would decline. Additionally, inflation had dropped from 2% in April to 1.6% by June. 
July marked the beginning of import tariffs that would be imposed on China, which further 
drove down expectations about future inflation and enhanced the possibility of future rate 
cuts. In August, the Fed had cut the Fed funds target rate by 25bps. Two more rate cuts 
followed in October, and December resulting in a new target rate of 1.5% - 1.75%. Bond 
markets had reacted accordingly as the rate on 3-Month Treasury bonds had dropped from 
2% in August, to roughly 1.5% in December.  
Conclusion 
This paper has shown how the Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis, the Duration 
Premium Theory, and Market Segmentations Theory, provide investors with explanations 
of the term structure of interest rates. It has also been shown how all of the theories can be 
utilized in order to provide a more complete explanation of the yield curve. Further, the 
narrative of the Federal Reserve and their explanation for the term structure of interest 
rates has been analyzed and we have added to the Fed’s explanations by introducing all of 
the theories in each of these analyzed periods. Although the explanations of the Fed have 
been validated, the other theories (mainly UET) have been validated in explaining the term 
structure of interest rates. Challenges that have been presented to each Federal Reserve 
Regime have been covered, and we have analyzed how monetary policies have shaped 
investor activities, and expectations. To conclude, it is favorable to investors to consider all 
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three theories when analyzing the yield curve, in contrast to only one, to build a more 
complete framework of the term structure of interest rates.  
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